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"Low-Value" & "Predictably Small":
When Should Class-Arbitration
Waivers be Invalidated as
Unconscionable?
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach1
I. INTRODUCTION
In Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, the New Jersey Supreme
Court chose the interests of consumers over liberally construed Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) policies in deciding that a no class-arbitration provision contained
within a payday loan contract was unconscionable. 2 The court used state law
contract principles to invalidate the clause, finding that the clause violated several
state public policies. 3 Particularly important to the court was the fact that individ-
ual claims for damages would be nominal, and thus individual vindication of sta-
tutory rights would prove too costly to be practical.4 In making this distinction,
the court suggested a preference for protecting individuals who have entered into
contracts of adhesion with little or no chance of protecting themselves outside of
the availability of the class mechanism. The court's decision may serve as a gui-
depost for other jurisdictions attempting to shape the law in the undefined arena of
class-arbitration waivers. The court signals that freedom to contract under the
FAA is important, but not at the expense of protecting individual claimants and
the statutory rights of consumers.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Plaintiff Jaliyah Muhammad, at the time of suit, was a part-time college stu-
dent in Paramus, New Jersey. 5 Defendant County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, De-
laware (County Bank) is a federally insured lender.6 Easy Cash and Telecash are
registered trade names of County Bank, and Main Street Service Corp. (Main
Street) is a loan servicer for County Bank.7 In April, May, and June of 2003 Mu-
hammad received three similar loans from County Bank. Before receiving her
first, Muhammad was required to complete a Loan Application. 9 Muhammad
signed this standard form contract on April 28, 2003, and was not required to
I. 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 98-102.
4. Id. at 99-100.
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complete additional Loan Applications for the other loans. l0 She was required to
sign an additional Loan Note and Disclosure form prior to receiving the second
loan on May 23, 2003.11
The second loan, which was analyzed extensively by the court, was a $200,
short-term, unsecured, single advance loan from County Bank. 12 According to the
loan's terms, the principal and a finance charge of $60 were due on June 13,
2003.13 The annual percentage rate on the loan was listed as 608.33%.14 Mu-
hammad twice extended this loan because she was unable to pay, incurring an
additional $120 in finance charges.15
Both the Loan Application and the Loan Note and Disclosure forms contained
arbitration agreements. 16 The Loan Application contained an Agreement to Arbi-
trate All Disputes. 17 This section contained a provision stating that "all claims,
disputes, or controversies ...shall be resolved by binding individual (and not
class) arbitration.... 8 Further, an additional notice emphasized that the appli-
cant was indeed giving up the chance to litigate and was instead subject to binding
arbitration. 19 The Loan Application also contained an Agreement Not To Bring,
Join or Participate In Class Actions, which contained language explicitly forbid-
ding any class action claims, but not individual arbitration claims. 20 Additionally,
above the signature line the Loan Application contained language stating that by
"signing below you agree to all the terms of this note, including the Agreement to
Arbitrate All Disputes and the Agreement Not To Bring, Join or Participate In
Class Actions." 21 The Loan Note and Disclosure form signed respecting the
second loan contained similar provisions, including an Agreement to Arbitrate All
22Disputes and an Agreement Not To Bring, Join or Participate In Class Actions.
"In February of 2004, Muhammad filed a putative class-action suit in New






15. Id. The Annual Percentage Rate is "a measure of the cost of credit, expressed at a yearly rate."
12 C.F.R. § 226.14(a) (2007). This section, 226, is know as "Regulation Z" and implements the provi-
sions of the Truth in Lending Act. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2007) (Section 226.14 contains the formula
that must be used for determining APR).
16. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 92-93. The agreements stipulated that arbitration would be under the
auspices of the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). Id.
17. Id. at91.
18. Id. at 91-92.
19. Id. at 93. "Notice: You and we would have had a right or opportunity to litigate disputes through
a court and have a judge or jury decide the disputes but have agreed instead to resolve disputes through
binding arbitration." Id.
20. Id.
Agreement Not To Bring, Join Or Participate In Class Actions: To the extent permitted by law,
by signing below you agree that you will not bring, join or participate in a class action as to any
claim, dispute or controversy you may have against us.... This agreement does not constitute a
waiver of any of your rights and remedies to pursue a claim individually and not as a class action
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Street., 23 Muhammad alleged that Easy Cash, Telecash, and Main Street violated
the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute,24
the civil usury act, 25 and the Consumer Fraud Act,26 by charging and conspiring to
charge illegal interest rates. The complaint further alleged that County Bank
aided and abetted the other defendants' violative conduct by renting out the Coun-
ty Bank name without actually funding any of the loans. Muhammad sought
injunctive relief, damages, restitution, penalties, and CoStS. 29
Defendants removed the action to federal court, but the case was remanded to
state court. 30 Defendants then filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the
claim pending arbitration, as well as a motion requesting a protective order with
respect to discovery. 31 Muhammad opposed each motion and filed a cross-motion
concerning discovery. 32 Muhammad argued that "the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable based on the class-action waiver, the costs of arbitration, discov-
ery limitations in the National Arbitration Forum's (NAF) rules, and the inherent
bias in choosing the NAF as a forum."
33
The New Jersey trial court granted Defendants' motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the FAA and stayed the case pending arbitration. 34 The court granted
Muhammad's motion for leave to appeal.35 The New Jersey Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court's decision, finding the arbitration agreement was not un-
conscionable. 36 Thereafter, Muhammad filed a motion for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey.37 This motion was granted.38 On August 9, 2006,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the presence of the class-arbitration
agreement rendered the agreement unconscionable and that the agreement should




24. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:41-1 (2005).
25. N.J. REV. STAT. § 31:1-1 (1998).
26. N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:8-2 (2001).
27. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 93.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The federal court determined the claim was not preempted by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(d) (2000)).
31. Id.
32. Id. The cross-motion argued that because of a discovery limitation in National Arbitration
Forum rules where the cost of discovery must be commensurate with the amount of the claim, Mu-
hammad was precluded from obtaining relief. In other words, because the amount of damages is only
$180, discovery would be limited to that amount, and that is insufficient in a complex claim. Id. at 93
n. 1.
33. Id. at 93. In response to the cross-motion, the defendants offered to arbitrate Muhammad's
claims in the American Arbitration Association, but this offer was rejected. Id. at 93-94.
34. Id. at 94.
35. Id.
36. Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 877 A.2d 340, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005).
37. Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 883 A.2d 1054, 1054 (N.J. 2005).
38. Id.
39. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 100, 103.
No. 2]
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HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The FAA attempts to promote certain goals of arbitration, including: speed,
low-costs, party autonomy, privatization, arbitrator expertise, neutrality, finality,
and fair hearings.4° Parties are given significant freedom to contract for the ways
in which particular disputes will be settled in arbitration. 41 Businesses, favoring
the many benefits of arbitration, have resorted to mandatory binding arbitration
clauses.42 Clauses banning class-wide arbitration are a new feature to mandatory
arbitration contracts and have quickly become popular among businesses. 43 Com-
panies have chosen to use class-arbitration waivers to shield themselves from the
possibility of class liability.44
A. Courts' Treatment of Class-Arbitration Clauses
The pro-arbitration policy of the FAA does not preclude an arbitration agree-
ment or a particular clause therein, from being declared void upon judicial review.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements covered by the Act
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 4  These grounds for revocation in-
clude state law contract principles such as unconscionability and public policy.
46
When a particular clause is attacked on these grounds, the question requires judi-
cial resolution.47 On the other hand, the arbitrator will decide questions pertaining
to the interpretation of the arbitration agreement.48 Further, if an arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue of class-arbitration, the arbitrator will make a rul-
ing in light of the contract language.49
Federal circuits are in disagreement as to whether arbitration clauses explicit-
ly waiving the availability of class-arbitration are valid under the FAA. ° State
40. See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL AsSESsMENT 3
(2006).
41. See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 469,478.
42. See Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685,685 (2004).
43. Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jenson, Mandatory Arbitration: Using Arbitration To Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004).
44. Id at 75-76.
45. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
46. See Burton, supra note 41, at 485-86.
47. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (whether the parties have a valid
arbitration agreement is a "gateway" issue that requires judicial resolution).
48. Seeld. at 451-53.
49. Id. at 453.
50. Validating the clause: Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The
Arbitration Agreement at issue here explicitly precludes the [plaintiffs] from bringing class claims or
pursuing 'class action arbitration,' so we are therefore 'obliged to enforce the type of arbitration to
which these parties agreed, which does not include arbitration on a class basis."'). Champ v. Siegel
Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995); Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest
Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 2002). Invalidating the clause: Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (Class-arbitration waiver invalid as conflicting with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
[Vol. 2007
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courts, including federal courts applying state law, are also divided on the validity
of class-arbitration waivers, but all will make rulings based on state contract law.
Thus, courts will often validate or invalidate class-arbitration clauses based upon
state law contract principles such as unconscionability and public policy.
52
Both state and federal courts have looked to numerous factors when evaluat-
ing class-arbitration clauses.53 Courts will often separate the factors amongst the
two prongs present in most state unconscionability analyses. 54 The first prong,
procedural unconscionability, will address whether the contract is a contract of
adhesion and whether the contract is a product of predatory lending or bargaining
practices.55 Procedural unconscionability, although relevant, is not typically dis-
positive to the unconscionability analysis.5 6 For instance, where a contract of
adhesion is found, courts will often assume that some degree of procedural un-
conscionability exists and then invalidate the class-arbitration clause if they de-
termine that a fatal degree of substantive unconscionability is present.57
When examining a clause for substantive unconscionability, many courts
have looked for the existence of a statutory right, and whether or not the clause at
issue makes it impossible to seek vindication of the right. 58 If a statutory right is
involved the court may inquire as to whether or not the statute provides for attor-
ney' s fees or costs. 59 Many courts will look to the amount of damages that may be
available to an individual claimant under the relevant statute, and these courts will
generally disfavor class-arbitration clauses where only nominal individual damag-
51. Validating the clause: Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877-78
(11 th Cir. 2005) (applying Ga. Law); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th
Cir. 2002) (Applying Md. contract principles); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 629 S.E.2d
865, 873-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494 (111. App. Ct. 2003)
(Arbitration clause not unconscionable even though it bars class-arbitration); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005) (Class-actions are a procedural right, and thus their
waiver is not necessarily substantively unconscionable). Invalidating the clause: Wong v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., No. 05-73922, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49444, at *12-*13 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2006) (Ap-
plying Mich. law, the court found that the waiver prevented consumers from pursuing Mich. statutory
rights); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger,
567 S.E.2d 265, 278-80 (W. Va. 2002) (arbitration agreement unconscionable as it waived class-
arbitration and punitive damages); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574, 576-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (arbitration clause unconscionable because it waived statutory rights and precluded class-
arbitration).
52. E.g. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682, 687 (1996) ("Generally applicable con-
tract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionabiity, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2 .....
53. E.g., Leonard 854 So. 2d at 536-38.
54. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (The
prevailing view is that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present to invalidate
a clause as unconscionable.).
55. E.g., Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729 N.W. 2d 732, 441-47 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
56. See, e.g., Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006).
57. Id.
58. E.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D. Mass. 2006). But
see Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (clauses effective even though
"they may render class actions to pursue statutory claims under the TILA or the EFTA unavailable").
59. E.g., Winig v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. C 06 4297 MMC, 2006 WL 2766007 at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2006).
No. 2]
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es are possible. 60 Other courts will look for evidence of fairness in the contract,
including whether the clause is intended to protect the defendant from liability.
61
In addition to examining factors under the relevant contract analysis, courts
will often weigh pertinent public policies when deciding whether to validate a
class-arbitration waiver.62 Courts have noted the general policy favoring arbitra-
tion, the policies underlying the class-action mechanism, and policies relevant to
the enactment of certain state or federal statutes. 63 Courts invalidating class waiv-
ers have expressed concern that individual claimants may go without redress,
noting that the class-mechanism protects the rights of individuals whose sole poss-
ible remedy may lie in a class claim when the possibility of a sizeable recovery is
minimal. 64 Further, class actions provide incentives to properly investigate claims
that would be too time-consuming if the only prospect was a nominal, individual
recovery. 65  Courts have also noted that class actions can benefit the judicial
process by avoiding the expense, in terms of time and money, of re-litigating simi-
lar claims. 66 Class actions can also create "substantial funds" that provide for
attorneys fees and contingency fees so that attorneys may take a case although
there is a possibility of receiving no recovery. 67 Courts enforcing class-arbitration
clauses have not attacked the policies behind class-actions or particular statutes,
but have instead stated that the strong policy favoring arbitration agreements
trumps other policies at issue.
68
B. The California Cases
As class-arbitration waivers are relatively recent phenomena, in many juris-
dictions there is little certainty as to how a court will rule on a particular clause.
California courts, on the other hand, have developed a significant body of law
regarding class-arbitration waivers.69 California courts have ruled on class-
60. E.g., Stern v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146, 1149 (C.D. Cal 2006)
(waiver unconscionable as only a small amount of damages are possible); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 267 (i1. 2006) (waiver acts only to prevent customers from seeking redress for
small amounts of money).
61. E.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) The bar on class arbitration
threatens the premise that arbitration can be "a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory
rights." Id. (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
62. E.g. Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 267-68.
63. Id. at 260.
64. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980); Vasquez v. Super. Ct., 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971) ("Frequently
numerous consumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by the same seller so that proof of the
prevalence of the practice as to one consumer would provide proof for all. Individual actions by each
of the defrauded consumers is often impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be
insufficient to justify bringing a separate action.").
65. See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 234 (D.NJ. 2005).
66. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860 (1999) (Class actions provide the "opportunity to
save the enormous transaction costs of piecemeal litigation.").
67. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974).
68. E.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
69. See generally Jack Wilson, "No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses, " State-Law Unconscionabili-
ty and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action,
23 QUINNIPlAc L. REv. 737,763-68 (2004).
[Vol. 2007
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arbitration waivers in a variety of contexts, and examining this line of cases is
informative as to the development of analyses in a jurisdiction that will, in some
circumstances, strike the clauses as unconscionable.
Ting v. AT&T70 was a certified class-action suit brought by California AT&T
customers. 71 The class sought relief from a new consumer contract AT&T was
72attempting to impose on eighteen million long-distance customers. The new
contract contained a binding arbitration clause, including a class-arbitration waiv-
er.73 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, ap-
plying California law, found the Legal Remedies clause of the new contract void
as it contained unconscionable features.74  The court stated that the class-
arbitration waiver acted as a means for AT&T to shield itself from liability under
California law, and therefore the clause was unconscionable. 75 The court con-
cluded by stating that the unconscionable provisions would make it impossible for
customers to vindicate their rights, and thus the illegal provisions were to be en-
joined.76
Szetela v. Discover Bank,77 also decided in 2002, presents a similar set of
facts.78 The suit was brought as a putative class action, but Szetela's individual
claim for damages amounted to only twenty-nine dollars. 79 The Fourth District
California Court of Appeal found the amended credit-card contract, containing a
class-arbitration waiver, to be both procedurally and substantively unconsciona-
ble. 8° The procedural unconscionability analysis was similar to that used for con-
tracts of adhesion, focusing on the nature of the terms and whether the contract
was offered on a "take it or leave it" basis.81 The court found the contract to be
substantively unconscionable, noting that it could envision no way in which the
clause may harm Discover and many ways in which it may harm consumers.
82
For instance, consumers will often not seek redress for such small claims, and as
such Discover had "sought to create for itself virtual immunity from class or rep-
resentative actions despite their potential merit, while suffering no similar detri-
ment to its own rights." 83 The court stated further that the contract was inherently
unfair as it allowed millions of customers to be overcharged without an effective
70. 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 319 F. 3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding preemption of application of state law but still reaching a finding of unconscionability).
71. Id. at 906. One of the class parties was Consumer Action, a California non-profit group dedicat-
ed to consumer education and advocacy. Id.
72. Id. at 911-12. These eighteen million customers received a new contract with their bill, while
another forty-two million AT&T customers received the new contract in a separate envelope stating,
on the outside, "ATTENTION: Important Information concerning your AT&T service enclosed." Id. at
912.
73. Id. at 927.
74. Id. at 938-39.
75. Id. at 918.
76. Id. at 938-39.
77. 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
78. Id. at 864. Szetela received a new contract, containing a mandatory arbitration agreement, in-
cluded with his Discover Card bill. Id.
79. Id. at 865.
80. Id. at 867-68.
81. Id. at 867.
82. Id. at 867-68.
83. ld. at 867.
No. 2]
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method of redress. 84 Finally, the court addressed pertinent policy concerns, noting
that the class-arbitration agreement violated a California policy discouraging un-
fair and unlawful business practices and also violated public policy by seeking to
contract around procedures that allow the courts to operate in an efficient man-
ner.
85
After Szetela, the California Supreme Court made what was, at the time, the
most conclusive statement regarding class-arbitration clauses as interpreted by
California law. 86 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme
Court was afforded an opportunity to review and synthesize prior cases." The
court began its analysis by noting the importance of class action lawsuits under
California law.88 The court reiterated an endorsement of class-wide arbitration
generally and then addressed the line of cases, including Szetela, that have dis-
cussed class-arbitration waivers. 89 Stating that the clause in Szetela was "virtually
identical" to that in Discover Bank, the court moved on to an unconscionability
analysis.90 The court summarized the case law, and then noted the reasoning in-
cluded in other California cases, stating that the court "do[es] not hold that all
class action waivers are necessarily unconscionable." 91 The court continued to
state that where a class action waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion,
where a small amount of damages may be involved, and where it is shown that a
party with superior bargaining power has perpetuated a scheme to "deliberately
cheat" large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then
in these circumstances, and under California law, the waiver should be unenforce-
able.92
In Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. ,93 the California Court of Appeal reexamined the
principles laid out in Discover Bank, and finding them all relevant, applied a vir-
tually unchanged analysis.94 The court had to address the issue of when a claim is
no longer low-value. 95 In answering this question, the court rejected an argument
by DIRECTV that because some claims may reach up to one thousand dollars, the
class-arbitration wavier did not involve "a setting where disputes between the
contracting parties 'predictably involve small amounts of damages."' 96 The court
found the DIRECTV clause unconscionable, and concluded by reviewing several
other California decisions that reach the same result.
97
84. Id. at 868.
85. Id.
86. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
87. See id. at 1106-10.
88. Id. at 1105-06.
89. Id. at 1106-08.
90. Id. at 1104.
91. Id. at 1106-10.
92. Id. at 1110.
93. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
94. See id. at 816-23.
95. See id. at 820.
96. Id. at 820 (quoting Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
97. See id. at 820-23.
[Vol. 2007
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C. New Jersey Law
New Jersey recognizes several common law contract principles. Specifical-
ly, courts may declare contracts void as unconscionable or violative of public
policy.99 Further, New Jersey has adopted, by statute, the Uniform Commercial
Code provision recognizing the doctrine of unconscionability. 00 The standard for
evaluating specific contract provisions for unconscionability has been developed
by the courts.'
10
In Rudbart v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, 102 the New
Jersey Supreme Court opined the analysis that would be used when evaluating
contract provisions for unconscionability 0 3 There the court explained that the
initial inquiry is to determine whether the contract at issue is a contract of adhe-
sion.' °4 The court noted that the essential features of a contract of adhesion are
that the contract is presented on a take-it-or-leave it basis, on a standardized form,
and without the opportunity to negotiate on the terms by the adhering party.
0 5
The court stated that, if a contract is one of adhesion, then some indicia of proce-
dural unconscionability will necessarily be involved. 0 6 Thus, according to the
court, once a contract of adhesion is found, a court must move on to apply a fact-
sensitive analysis of substantive unconscionability. 10 7 The substantive test con-
sists of four factors which involve an inquiry into: "(1) the subject matter of the
contract, (2) the parties' relative bargaining positions, (3) the degree of compul-
sion motivating the "adhering" party, and (4) the public interests affected by the
contract."' 0 8 These factors are used to specifically analyze facts on a case-by-case
basis when evaluating claims of unconscionability. 0
The New Jersey Appellate Division first ruled on the issue of class-arbitration
waivers in Gras v. Associates First Capital Corp.110 There the plaintiffs had en-
tered into a series of five secured loan transactions with defendants where the
principal amount of each loan was between $27,000 and $68,000."' The plain-
tiffs were required to sign a contract which included a binding arbitration clause
and a class-arbitration waiver. 112 The plaintiffs brought suit alleging, among other
things, a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act." 3 The court applied a
98. See, e.g., Saxon Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Masterclean of N.C., Inc., 641 A.2d 1056, 1059 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
99. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 415 A.2d 1156, 1162, 1165-66 (N.J. 1980).
100. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302 (West 2004).
101. See, e.g., Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n., 605 A.2d 681, 685-87 (N.J. 1992).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 685-89.
104. Id. at 686.
105. Id. at 685 (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1174, 1176 (1983)).
106. See id. at 685-86.
107. Id. at 687.
108. Id.
109. Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (2006).
110. 786 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
111. Id. at 887-88.
112. Id. at 888. The clause noted specifically that "any claim or dispute based on a federal or state
statute" was also subject to individual, not class, arbitration. Id.
113. Id. at 887.
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Rudbart analysis and concluded the no class-action provision was a contract of
adhesion, but this alone did not render the contract unenforceable.' 14 The court
stated that claimants could still seek vindication of their statutory rights indivi-
dually through arbitration and that the loan agreements were clear enough to ade-
quately notify the plaintiffs as to a limitation of their rights.11 5 The court found
unpersuasive the cases plaintiffs focused on where courts found class-arbitration
agreements to be detrimental to consumer rights. 116 The court also held the CFA
was not at odds with arbitration; no public policy favoring class action could have
led the court to conclude that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable." 7
The appellate division had not changed its mindset by the time it ruled in Mu-
hammad.1 18 The Superior Court began its analysis of the facts by noting that New
Jersey has a strong policy favoring arbitration and requires liberal construction of
contracts in favor of arbitration." 9 The court noted that the language of the arbi-
tration agreement was plain and that the plaintiff was not bargaining away her
ability to assert her rights, but was only "agreeing to have the opportunity to vin-
dicate those rights in the arbitra[l] [forum].... 12 0 When specifically assessing the
validity of the class-arbitration waiver, the court noted its reluctance to depart
from the Gras holding.12 1 The court reiterated the Gras reasoning, by noting that
the court must balance the Consumer Fraud Act's policy of protecting consumers,
and the policy favoring arbitration agreements.12  The court did not balance the
two considerations but instead noted that "the absence of a legislative mandate or
overriding public policy in favor of class actions leads us to conclude that the
arbitration provision here is enforceable."'' 23 The court concludes by distinguish-
ing the New Jersey Law Division case, Discover Bank v. Shea.124 The Superior
Court stated that in Discover Bank the plaintiff had received a "bill stuffer" that
did not give proper notice of a waiver of rights, whereas Ms. Muhammad was
"clearly notified that she waived her right to file a class action."' 25
The Superior Court, when applying the Rudbart test, based much of its analy-
sis on the state policy favoring arbitration.' 26  The court also distinguished
precedent by focusing on procedural unconscionability, determining that the Dis-
cover Bank contract of adhesion did not pass muster as it was sent in the mail with
a bill, and the loan contract in the instant case was acceptable as the plaintiff was
clearly notified of her waiver of rights.' 27 This substantial deference toward arbi-
tration agreements and reliance on distinctions in the level of procedural uncons-
cionability would not prove to be as dispositive to the Supreme Court.
114. Id. at 889.
115. Id. at 888.
116. Id. at 891.
117. Id. at 892-93.
118. Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 877 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
119. Id. at 347 (citing Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc. 767 A.2d 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001)).
120. Id. at 350.
121. Id. at 353.
122. Id. at 354.
123. Id.
124. 827 A.2d 358 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001).
125. Muhammad, 877 A.2d at 355.
126. Id. at 351-55.
127. Id. at 355.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach,128 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court first examined general principles of arbitration as enacted in the FAA
and otherwise.129 The court noted that Section 2 of the FAA declares a national
policy favoring arbitration but explained that this policy does not preclude a judi-
cial examination into whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable under
state law. 130 The court continued by citing precedent establishing that the "gate-
way" question of whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement requires
judicial resolution. 131 The court then stated that, in particular, arbitration agree-
ments that are "silent" or "ambiguous" about the availability of class-wide arbitra-
tion must be interpreted by an arbitrator.' 32 The court distinguished the instant
case by noting that the relevant agreements are not silent or ambiguous as to class-
wide arbitration, as each agreement explicitly states that class-action arbitration
shall be waived. 133 The court stated that because arbitration agreements are sever-
able from the remainder of a contract, a challenge to the contract as a whole is a
question for an arbitrator to decide. 134 As justification for its authority in the in-
stant case, the court stated that where there are distinct class-arbitration waivers
within the arbitration agreement, as there are in the instant agreement, a court may
examine the validity of the class-arbitration waiver as part of the arbitration
agreement and not part of the contract as a whole.'
35
Having established its jurisdictional authority, the court continued its analysis
in light of New Jersey contract law. 136 The court noted that New Jersey recogniz-
es the doctrine of unconscionability, and courts "may refuse to enforce contracts
that are unconscionable."' 137 The court stated that Rudbart138 is controlling when
determining whether a specific provision of a contract is unenforceable based on
unconscionability.139 Having stated the proper test, the court addressed the merits
of the class-action procedure generally. 14 The court cited New Jersey precedent
stating that the rule favoring class actions should be construed liberally in cases
involving consumer fraud' 4' and that class actions are a "superior method of adju-
dication of consumer fraud claims."'
142
128. 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006).
129. Id. at 94.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 95 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
132. Id. at95.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 96 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); and
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 97 (quoting Saxon Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Masterclean of N.C., Inc., 273 N.J. Super.
231, 236 (1994)).
138. Rudbart v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681 (N.J. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 871(1992).
139. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 96.
140. Id.
141. In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736, 747-48 (1983).
142. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420,433 (1995).
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After the laudatory review of class actions generally, the court moved on to
an inquiry into "whether New Jersey contract law principles permit enforcement
of the class-arbitration agreements found in the instant arbitration agreements."'
143
After noting that the contract is clearly one of adhesion, the court applied the
substantive portion of the Rudbart four-factor test.144 The court stated that the
first three factors of the test require only brief attention and that the fourth factor,
regarding the public interests affected by the contract, will prove dispositive.
145
The court explained that the fourth factor requires the court to decide whether the
class-arbitration waiver is intended to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing their statu-
tory rights and thus to shield defendants from compliance with New Jersey law.
46
The court noted that in New Jersey, waivers that seek a release from statutori-
ly imposed rights are considered void as against public policy. 147 The court dis-
tinguished the class-arbitration clauses in the instant case by noting that they do
not act strictly as exculpatory clauses, as they do not prohibit Muhammad from
filing an individual claim to arbitrate.148 However, in the instant case, where a
small amount of damages is involved, the court explained that the enforcement of
Muhammad's individual rights and the rights of fellow-consumers becomes "dif-
ficult if not impossible."' 49 Thus, according to the court, the class-action clause
may have been effectively acting as an exculpatory clause.'
50
The court continued by noting that most cases involving a small amount of
damages will not be pursued by "rational" consumers because it will not be worth
the time prosecuting the case, even if counsel is willing to pursue the matter.'
5
'
The court then stated that without a class-action mechanism, many victims of
consumer fraud may remain ignorant to the fact they have been wronged.
52
Aside from the harm done to individual litigants, the court observed that class
action waivers may reduce the possibility that competent counsel will take a case,
thus functionally exculpating the fraudulent activity. 153 The court also noted that
class-action waivers can "prevent aggregate recovery that can serve as a source of
contingency fees for prospective attorneys."' 54 The court continued by stating that
while the defendants were not required to provide counsel for the plaintiff, they
may not take action that impedes "ordinary citizens' access to representation to
vindicate their rights."'' 55 The court then addressed the Defendants' argument that
attorney's fees are available under the CFA but found that this point was not dis-
positive due to the small amount of damages that Muhammad sought. 156 The
143. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 98.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 98-99. The first three factors are: "(1) the subject matter of the contract; (2) the parties'
relative bargaining positions; (3) the degree of... compulsion motivating the "adhering" party." Id. at
97.
146. Id. at 99.
147. Id. (citing McCarthy v. NASCAR, Inc., 226 A.2d 713,714 (1967)).
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court explained that the availability of attorney's fees is illusory if it is unlikely
that counsel would pursue the particular claim. 157 The court noted that here, even
with the damage multipliers provided by the CFA, Muhammad's claim for dam-
ages could not amount to more than six hundred dollars.' 58 The court found that
no reasonable attorney would be willing to take a complex consumer fraud action
for such a small incentive. 59 The court then reasoned that class-arbitration waiv-
ers are no less objectionable when a plaintiff sues under a statute without damage
multipliers or provisions for attorney's fees, and would, if treated as less objec-
tionable, lead to under-enforcement of statutes that the New Jersey Legislature has
marked for strenuous enforcement.
160
Thus, the court held that the class-arbitration waivers, as they appeared in
Muhammad's consumer arbitration agreements, were unconscionable.16' The
court moved on to address policy considerations underlying its holding.' 62 The
court stated that the public interest in protecting Muhammad's and other consum-
ers' right to effectively pursue their statutory rights overrides the defendants' right
to seek enforcement of the class-arbitration clauses. 63 The court stated that New
Jersey's public policy favoring arbitration is not determinative of whether a par-
ticular class-arbitration clause is unenforceable.1 64 The court then noted that
class-arbitration waivers do not promote arbitration policies, as they do not help in
creating a more efficient forum for adjudicating disputes. 65 After recognizing the
argument that these waivers are more efficient as they would likely lead to fewer
consumers seeking redress, the court explained that the purpose of arbitration is
not to dissuade consumers from seeking vindication of their rights.1 66 The court
further noted that the same criticisms of class-action procedures in the courts may
apply to class-arbitration, and the arbitration procedures may be no more efficient
than those litigated in court. 167 The court suggested that these inadequacies, in the
class-arbitration context may be alleviated by parties and arbitration forums fa-
shioning procedural rules. 168 Concluding this reasoning, the court noted that class
arbitration "is in its infancy and may provide a fertile ground for establishing flex-
ible class-action procedures."'
169
The court continued to clarify its position by stating that the instant holding is
based on a fact-sensitive public interest assessment under the Rudbart test and is
157. Id. The finance charge was $60, and rolled over twice, amounting to $180 in compensatory










166. Id. (citing Ting v. AT & T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 n. 16 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
167. Id. (citing Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 44-53 (2000); Jack Wilson, No-Class-Action Arbitration
Clauses, State Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial
Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 773-80 (2004)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1116 (Cal. 2005).
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not a declaration that the arbitral forum cannot provide a means of vindicating the
rights of consumers in fraud cases. 170 The court stated that its analysis does not
pertain only to Muhammad's ability to individually assert her statutory rights.'
71
The court explained that the holding also addresses the public interests affected by
the contract and includes a broader inquiry into how class-action waivers affect
the interests protected by the CFA.172
In conclusion, the court addressed the issue of severability. 73 The court
stated that although the class-arbitration clauses in the instant case are uncons-
cionable, they are still severable. 174 The court noted that, under New Jersey law, a
court may enforce the remaining valid portion of the contract after the severable
portions have been excised. 7 5 The court noted that the class-action waivers in the
instant contracts are explicitly severable as they include the language "[t]o the
extent permitted by law."'176 Thus, the court found that the contracts reflect an
intention that the arbitration agreement should be enforced even if a particular
provision is severed. 1
77
V. COMMENT
A. The Companion Case
On August 9, 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court also decided Delta Fund-
ing Corp. v. Harris, a companion case to Muhammad.178 The court was asked, in
response to a certification by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, whether an arbitration agreement in a consumer loan contract was un-
conscionable, in whole or in part, under New Jersey law. 179 The court determined
that the arbitration agreement's ambiguous provisions would need to be inter-
preted by the arbitrator before final resolution but held that several of the clauses
in the arbitration agreement may be declared unenforceable based on unconscio-
nability if the arbitrator interpreted the clauses unfavorably as to the consumer. 80
Nevertheless, the provision waiving class-arbitration was held to be enforcea-
ble.'
81
The defendant, Alberta Harris, was a seventy-eight year old woman at the
time of decision, with "only a sixth-grade education and little financial sophistica-
tion." 82 She had received a sub-prime loan from plaintiff Delta Funding Corp.,
which was secured by a mortgage on her home.' 83 The loan contract included an
170. Id. at 102.
171. Id.
172. Id.





178. 912 A.2d 104 (N.J. 2006).
179. Id. at 108.
180. Id. at 108.
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arbitration agreement that contained, amongst other provisions, a waiver of class-
arbitrations. 184 The court, as in Muhammad, determined that the contract was a
consumer contract of adhesion containing some degree of procedural unconscio-
nability and thus proceeded to apply the Rudbart factors.'
85
After finding certain provisions of the arbitration agreement unconscionable,
the court addressed the class-arbitration clause, even though Harris was not seek-
ing to bring a class claim.' 86 The court stated that class-arbitration waivers are not
unconscionable per se, and that Muhammad is distinguishable from the instant
case. 87 The court noted that in Muhammad the potential damages totaled less
than six hundred dollars, whereas Ms. Harris was seeking more than one hundred
thousand dollars. 188 The court stated that this is not the type of "low-value" suit
that would only be litigated in the presence of the class mechanism.' 89 The court
noted that because damages are substantial and her home is at stake in a foreclo-
sure proceeding, Ms. Harris is likely to contact an attorney.1 90 In contrast, the
court stated that in low-value claims there is little incentive to seek an attorney. 91
The court also found irrelevant the fact that all the statutes under which Ms. Harris
seeks redress provide for attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs prevailing on their
claims. 92 The court concluded by stating that the combination of statutory reme-
dies and the possibility of substantial damages amounted to an enforceable class-
arbitration waiver.1
93
In light of the Delta opinion, the Muhammad holding seems increasingly nar-
row. The court in Delta emphasized the fact that statutory provisions accounted
for attorney's fees and costs, and that Ms. Harris sought a "substantial" amount of
damages. The Delta opinion stated that one hundred thousand dollars in possible
damages is a substantial amount, but neither opinion made a precise ruling as to
what amount will certainly warrant substantiality. Thus, as Delta distinguished
Muhammad by noting that Muhammad pertains only to low-value suits, Muham-
mad can only be read as applying to suits where the possibility of damages is six
hundred dollars or less. The court has left a great deal of room for litigation over
what amounts to a low-value suit.'
94
It also remains unclear whether the court would have struck the class-
arbitration clause in Delta if it had a chance to rule on the alleged facts as they
favored Ms. Harris. 195 The court upheld the class-arbitration waiver on facts that
pertained to substantive unconscionability, but declined to address the facts rele-
184. Id. at 109.
185. Id. at 111.








194. "At some point, an amount of damages will be high enough to attract counsel if attorney's fees
are available, even though no counsel would take the same case if no attorney's fees were available."
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100 n.5 (N.J. 2006).
195. The dissent notes, among other facts, that Ms. Harris was "rushed" into signing papers at 10 p.m.
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vant to procedural unconscionability. The court stated that further inquiry into
procedural unconscionability would be left to the arbitrator as the pertinent facts
were in dispute. Thus the court did not have a chance to determine whether the
alleged predatory practices and unfair bargaining were severe enough to render
the contract void based primarily on procedural unconscionability. 1
96
B. A minor victory for consumers
The Supreme Court's holding in Muhammad will protect some consumers
from a certain type of unconscionable arbitration provision contained within con-
tracts of adhesion. The holding is fact specific, as required by Rudbart, and thus
Muhammad will only protect, with certainty, those consumers with similar factual
scenarios. In other words, the holding will protect those consumers who have
entered into contracts of adhesion and have low-value claims. 197 Thus, the ruling
seems to support the policies behind the Consumer Fraud Act, but in practical
terms, the Muhammad holding has little reach.
The court had a chance to take a harder line on class-arbitration waivers, but
declined to do so. By taking a conservative judicial approach, the court has left a
substantial amount of grey area in which to decide whether a class-arbitration
waiver is unconscionable. The holding will not curtail litigation over the validity
of similar arbitration agreements. Neither will the ruling improve the position of
consumers in regards to class-arbitration waivers, except where the waiver is con-
tained in a "bill stuffer" or something of similar import, and a predictably small
amount of damages is at stake.
Although the ruling did leave questions unanswered, Muhammad may be seen
as a victory for supporters of consumers' rights, as it does protect a certain class of
consumers, particularly those who have entered into payday agreements for low-
value loans. The holding could have been extended to protect the rights of more
consumers, though, had the court chosen to focus less on the dollar value of an
individual's claim, and more on other factors affecting the consumer's chance of
vindicating her rights in a dispute. Judging whether rights may be vindicated by
the possible amount of an individual claim becomes difficult as the dollar value of
the claim increases. Whether an individual may find an attorney to litigate a claim
does not depend solely on the amount of the claim at issue. For instance, many
attorneys would be reluctant to take a case against a sophisticated party with expe-
rienced attorneys. Attorney experience and the amount of time it may take litigat-
ing a claim will be as important as potential claim-value when deciding whether
or not to take a case. 198 Further, claims rising just above the low-value level may
not prove substantial enough, in the absence of the class mechanism, to provide
notice to consumers similarly situated. Thus, the potential value of a particular
claim should be viewed along with other factors, as it is not the only incentive that
196. "Courts generally have applied a sliding-scale approach to determine overall unconscionability,
considering the relative levels of both procedural and substantive unconscionability." Id. at 111 (citing
Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915,921-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)).
197. The low-value factor is in-line with California's "predictably... small" approach. See Discover
Bank v. Super Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
198. "[C]lass actions equalize adversaries and provide a procedure to remedy a wrong that might
otherwise go unredressed." In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736, 741 (N.J. 1983).
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consumers have for bringing claims and is not a way to speculate, with certainty,
whether a claim will be brought.
In protecting consumer rights, the court apparently had to choose policies be-
hind statutory rights over the general policy favoring arbitration agreements. This
is not necessarily so. As arbitration agreements stand for freedom to bargain for
the way in which disputes will be settled, class-arbitration waivers stand for un-
equal bargaining power, as there are no reasons for consumers to agree to these
clauses. In fact, the procedurally unconscionable practices by which these clauses
are forced on consumers are antithetical to arbitration, as they do not suggest that
people are actually agreeing on the ways in which future disputes will be settled.
On the other hand, persuasive arguments may be made in favor of these
clauses. Businesses and commentators have pointed to the expense of class-
actions, the fear of "rogue" arbitrators, and the fact that there will be less litigation
as fewer consumers will seek redress.199 Further, as Judge Posner has noted, one
benefit of having parties litigate individually is that the fate of a company would
not have to be staked on one dispute. 2°° Additionally, opponents of judicial sever-
ance of class-arbitration waivers may respond that the economic benefits received
by precluding class-actions will be passed on to consumers. The Muhammad
court responded to these efficiency arguments by noting that arbitration should not
be used to dissuade consumers from seeking vindication of their rights for effi-
ciency's sake.2 °1
Indeed, Muhammad may suggest a trend toward greater scrutiny of class-
arbitration waivers. This is far from clear, though, as many jurisdictions continue
down the "majority" path, and at least one state has recently validated class-
arbitration waivers by statute. 20 2 Alternatively, arbitral organizations such as
JAMS and the AAA have publicly criticized, and are now refusing to arbitrate,
such claims. 20 3 Implicit in this refusal is the organizations' belief that the policy
favoring arbitration can still be furthered without the class-arbitration waivers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the New Jersey Supreme Court signaled that they will
make a priority of protecting consumers from business schemes designed to cheat
customers out of small sums. The court could have protected consumers to a
greater degree, though, by focusing less on the proposition that low-value claims
are difficult to litigate and more on other factors that contribute to the vindication
of consumers' rights. Indeed, the holding does not amount to a per se invalidation
of class-arbitration clauses, and class-arbitration waivers will still be valid in
many circumstances under New Jersey contract law.
CHRISTOPHER B. MCKINNEY
199. See, e.g., Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 101-02 (N.J. 2006).
200. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
201. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 101-02.
202. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-105 (Supp. 2007).
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